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Abstract 
 
In most destination countries, immigration policies are increasingly tilted toward the most skilled 
individuals. Whether this shift hurts economic prospects in sending countries, as argued by the 
traditional brain drain literature, is somewhat controversial. The most recent literature has focused 
on the link between skilled out-migration and educational achievements. In this paper, we 
emphasize a different channel. It is often argued that skilled migrants raise economic welfare at 
home thanks to a relatively larger flow of remittances. Skilled migrants typically earn relatively 
more and, ceteris paribus, will therefore remit more. However, they are also likely to spend a longer 
span of time abroad and also are more likely to reunite with their close family in the host country. 
Both factors should be associated with a relatively smaller flow of remittances from skilled 
migrants. Hence, the sign of the impact of the brain drain on total remittances is an empirical 
question. We first develop a simple model showing that skilled migrants may have indeed a lower 
propensity to remit home out of a given flow of earnings abroad. We then derive an empirical 
equation of remittances and estimate it on a large panel of developing countries. As a measure of 
the brain drain, we use the dataset by Docquier and Marfouk (2004) that in turn builds on the 
pioneering work of Carrington and Detragiache (2004). We find considerable evidence that the 
brain drain is associated with a smaller flow of remittances.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Immigration policies in receiving countries is increasingly tilted in favour of skilled migrants 
(Beine et al. 2003, OECD, 2003). This trend has raised considerable concern among policy makers 
in developing countries, afraid of having to bear the cost of education of skilled migrants and of 
losing their most entrepreneurial and talented workers. Anecdotal evidence is startling. According 
to Stalker (1994), Jamaica had to train five doctors to retain just one, Grenada 22. Central America 
and the Caribbean countries are particularly affected by the brain drain, presumably because of their 
proximity to the US. African countries have also suffered from a massive emigration of their skilled 
workers, with 30% of the best educated manpower working abroad, chiefly in the EU. 
 
The brain drain is not, however, an unmitigated curse, at least in theory. The possibility for 
educated migrants to move abroad should raise the returns to education and, in the end, may even 
lead to an increase in the numbers of educated workers that stay at home (Bhagwati and Hamada, 
1976; Bhagwati, 1974; Mountford, 1997; Stark et al. 1997, 1998). Moreover, skilled migrants will 
typically earn more and may therefore remit more (Ratha, 2003), relieving the foreign exchange 
constraint at home and hence fostering growth. Yet, even the impact of remittances on home 
country growth is open to question. Much of the most descriptive literature on remittances argue 
that they are used “unproductively”, citing micro evidence that too often remittance income is 
wasted on conspicuous expenditures
1. More elaborate models conclude that higher remittances may 
exacerbate moral hazard problems on the recipient’ side and discourage work effort. Growth may 
fall as a result. Building on this argument, Chami et al. (2003) argue that remittances are not an 
effective source of capital for development. 
 
In this paper we take a fresh look at the first issue, namely whether the brain drain is associated with 
a larger flow of remittances. We find that the conventional wisdom is, as it often happens, wrong. 
There is no evidence that skilled workers remit more. This is not so simply because they come from 
relatively wealthy families. Rather, it also reflects the fact that skilled migrants are relatively more 
likely to spend a longer time span abroad,  thereby weakening their ties with the home country. 
Overall, we conclude that the growing bias in receiving countries toward skilled migration is likely 
to penalize the flow of remittances back to sending countries. 
 
 
                                                 
1 See however Adams (1991, 1998) for a contrarian view.   3
2. The behaviour of skilled migrants: some descriptive evidence 
 
The impact of the emigration of the highly skilled on the economic prospects of origin countries is 
highly controversial. The early literature (Bhagwati, 1976) tended to concluded that the brain drain 
was detrimental to sending countries. Even when skilled workers happened to be unemployed at 
home, their social marginal productivity was not necessarily nil, as they could have moved inland in 
the countryside, where they would have been employed productively. More crucially, the costs of 
education are borne by the home country tax payers. The more recent literature is however more 
nuanced as to the effects of the brain drain. Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997, 1998), and Beine 
et al. (2001, 2003)  argue that the possibility of migrating abroad raises the returns to education and 
may therefore boost the investment in education. It could then well be that, ex post, even after some 
of the educated workers have moved abroad, the home country share of educated people rises rather 
than falling.  
 
A different line of argument emphasises the role of remittances. According to Ratha (2003), “the 
negative effects of brain drain are offset to some extent by inward remittances from migration 
workers”. There is indeed some (limited) evidence that remittances tend to increase with the level of 
skills (Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974; Rempel and Lobfell, 1978). Presumably, skilled migrants earn 
relatively more and therefore are, ceteris paribus,  likely to remit more. However, there are many 
unresolved issues with this strand of literature. First, the evidence is not univocal, with for instance 
Rodriguez and Horton (1994) showing in the case of the Philippines that the educational level of 
migrants has no impact on the amount of remittances. Second, skilled workers may come from 
more educated and wealthy families and have therefore less of an incentive to remit. Finally, they 
may spend a longer period of time abroad
2, either because they are more willing to reunify with 
their families in the host country or face lesser constraints in doing so. Indeed, a  typical finding in 
the literature is that the flow of remittances tends to decline with the length of the migrants’ stay 
(Lucas and Stark, 1985). Therefore, even a positive coefficient of education on remittances cannot 
be taken as evidence that the brain drain is associated with a larger flow of remittances. The direct 
effect of skills may indeed be positive, but the overall effect, that controls for the longer propensity 
to stay abroad of skilled migrants, may well be negative.  
 
                                                 
2 More direct evidence on the positive relationship between education and duration of stay comes from Reagan and 
Olsen (2000) for the US. Similarly, the intended duration of stay is found to rise with education in Germany (Steiner 
and Villing, 1994). Knerr (1994) also finds that for Pakistan skilled migrants tend to stay longer abroad than unskilled 
workers.   4
There is indeed substantive evidence that skilled migrants tend to stay longer in the host country. 
Borjas and Brastberg (1996) show that, under fairly general conditions, return migration will tend to 
amplify the initial selection bias. Hence, if migrants were initially relatively skilled, then the least 
skilled will be more likely to return to their home country. Intuitively, if the initial selection bias is 
positive with the more skilled also more prone to migrate, then the least skilled will be the marginal 
migrants and will be more likely therefore to reconsider their initial decision.. Solimano (2002) 
reports that, at least in science and engineering (S&E), a large fraction of Ph.d. graduates from 
developing countries tends to remain in the US after graduating. National Science Foundation data 
show that, four years after graduation, 88 and 79 percent of  respectively China’s and India’s 
graduates in S&E  are still working in the United States. More comprehensive evidence comes from 
Lindstrom and Massey (1994) for Mexican migrants, Reagan and Olsen (2000) for the US, Bauer 
and Gang (1998) for Egypt, Steiner and Velling (1994) and Schmidt (1994) for Germany. 
Rodriguez and. Horton (1994) show that, in the case of the Philippines, returnees are somewhat less 
educated than those still abroad. Finally, Borjas (1989) shows that the least successful foreign 
scientists are more likely to return home from the US.  
  
In what follows, we provide further evidence on this set of issues for the European case. We rely on 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) that collects data on European households from 
1994 to 2001. We focus on foreign born individuals with a view to assessing whether skilled 
migrants are more likely to reunite with their close family members and less likely to return home. 
In figure 1, we show the percentage of households where spouses are reunited and live in the same 
dwelling. We see that for Europe as a whole and for all periods low individuals are less likely to be 
reunited with their spouse.  
 
The ECHP is a closed panel and cannot be easily used therefore to study return migration. However, 
some useful insights come from an analysis of the pattern of attrition. Clearly, other factors in 
addition to the migrants’ choice to return home may affect attrition.  We assume therefore that 
attrition is due either to the unwillingness of respondents to be interviewed again or to their choice 
to move to a different location, possibly to their home country. Accordingly, we include among the 
regressors the number of visits for the interview (under the plausible assumption that individuals are 
more likely to drop out of the panel when interviews are very time consuming)  and a set of time 
dependent dummies for the immigrant’s region of origin, with the view to picking up the effect that 
changing conditions in the home country may have on the return decision of migrants. We estimate 
a simple equation where the probability for an immigrant of remaining (i.e. not dropping out) from   5
the panel is a function of his/her individual and household characteristics. Finally, we estimate two 
separate equations for immigrants from other EU countries and for non EU immigrants. The key 
finding (table 1) is that more educated immigrants from non EU countries are less likely to drop out 
from the panel, even after controlling for age, gender, employment status, and their length of stay in 
the host country. The effect is statistically significant for immigrants from non EU countries. 
Whether this finding indicates that educated immigrants are more willing to be interviewed again or 
less likely to move elsewhere is difficult to determine. What can be said however is that this effect 




3. Remittances and the brain drain: a simple model  
 
The evidence in the previous section provides considerable support to the notion that skilled 
migrants tend to stay longer in the host country, and are more likely to reunite with their close 
family members. We illustrate the implications of these findings for remittances with the help of a 
simple model.  
 
We assume that the household is made of two different groups, one very close and the other less 
close to the migrant. Moreover, only “close” family members are assumed to reunite with the 
migrant in the host country. The size of each group is normalized to 1. Hence, in what follows, fR 
(with 0 ≤ fR  ≤ 1) is both the percentage and the number of close family’s members that live with 
the migrant abroad. Let also CD, CH, and CR denote the consumption respectively of “distant” 
family members (D), of  those “close” family members that stay at home (H), and of those “close” 
family members that have reunited with the migrant (R). Finally, we assume that the utility of an 
(altruistic) migrant can be represented as follows: 
 
U = U(CM,fR) + fR V
C(CR) + (1-fR) V
C(CH)+V
D(CD)      (1) 
 
where CM is the migrant’s own consumption. Migrants therefore derive utility from their own 
consumption ( CM), the consumption of their non migrating close relatives [(1-fR) V
C(CH)], of those 
who reside abroad together with them [fR V
C(CR)] and of their more distant relatives [V
D(CD)]. We 
make two key assumptions. First, migrants also enjoy the proximity of their close family: their   6
utility therefore is increasing in fR, i.e. Uf >0. Second, for a given C, both the level and the marginal 






’D(C)        (2) 
 
There are four budget constraints, one for the migrant: 
  
CM = w – (fR RR + (1-fR) RH + RD)  - θ fR        (3) 
 
and one for each of the household groups:  
 
Ci = Yi + Ri           i  =  R ,  H ,  D      (4) 
 
In equation 3, w denotes the migrant’s wage, Ri remittances to group i, and θ the cost for the 
migrant of bringing his relatives to the host country. Migrant’s consumption is then equal to his 
wage minus the sum of remittances and reunification costs. In equation 4, household members have 
two sources of revenue, namely their own income (Yi) and remittances (Ri).  
 
The first order condition with respect to remittances to, say, non migrating close household 
members (RH) can be written as: 
 
-(1-fR) UC(CM,fR) + (1-fR) V’
C(YH+RH) = 0  →  UC(CM,fR) = V’
C(YH+RH)   (5) 
 
After deriving analogous conditions for RR and for RD we find that: 
 
 U C(CM,fR) = V’
C(YH+RH) = V’
C(YR+RR) = V’
D(YD+RD)     (6) 
 
which because of (2) implies: 
 
 (YH+RH) = (YR+RR) > (YD+RD)         ( 7 )  
 
Then, unless  YD is significantly smaller than YH (a somewhat implausible case, given that YH will 
typically fall following the migration of one of his close members), we have that remittances to   7
close non migrating household members (RH) will be larger than those to distant family members 
(RD).  
 
Given (6), the first order condition with respect to fR reads simply as:  
 
-UC θ + Uf = 0 → Uf / UC = θ         ( 8 )  
 
which states that the marginal rate of substitution between fR and CM must be equal to its cost. This 
condition will play, as we shall see below, a key role in our results. 
 
We are now ready to examine the impact of a higher skill content of migration. More skilled 
migrants will typically earn a higher wage abroad. From equations 1 and 3 we can easily see that an 
increase in w will, for a given flow of remittances and an unchanged value of fR, lead to a rise in the 
migrant’s own consumption (CM) and, as a result, to a fall in the marginal utility of CM. Hence, Uf / 
Uc will be greater than θ. For a new equilibrium to obtain, the degree of family reunification will 
also have to rise, so as to bring Uf / Uc back in line with θ. As claimed, (high wage) skilled migrants 
will be therefore more likely to reunite with their family.  
 
What about remittances? Given (6), in the new equilibrium both V’
C and V’
D will need to fall and, 
as a result, for a given set of Yi’s, remittances to all groups (H, R and D) will increase
3. However, 
the fact that both RH and RD  will increase does dot necessarily imply that the total flow of “actual” 
remittances
4 will increase. There will be indeed two effects. First, as just noticed,  the amount of per 
capita remittances will rise both for non migrating “close” and “distant” family members (the 
“wage” effect). Second, a larger share of “close” family members will reunite with the migrant. The 
composition of non migrating members will therefore shift toward the low remittance group. i.e. the 
distant family members (the “reunification” effect
5). If the latter effect is stronger than the wage 
effect, per capita remittances to non migrating household members will decline. The model does not 
provide an unambiguous answer in this respect. Only empirical analysis can resolve such 
ambiguity.  
                                                 
3 More formally, Ri and fR will increase following a rise in w if they are both normal goods, i.e. if Uik – Ukk Ui /Uk > 0.  
4 In what follows we focus on “actual” remittances, namely the amount of transfers to non migrating household 
members (RH and RD). Indeed, RR (the remittances to those “close” family members that have already reunited with the 
migrant) is simply an intra household transfer and does not generate any foreign exchange inflow for the home country. 
5 Reunification may well be dictated by immigration laws in the host country. Yet, reunification procedures are 
typically quite generous in most destination countries. Moreover, migrants have considerable leeway in selecting which 
close family members to bring to the host country. Migrants may also select the host country based on the latter’s 
provisions for family reunification. Overall, therefore, reunification is likely to be largely endogenous.     8
 
Finally, we can also examine the impact of higher income at home. If Yi rises, the marginal utility 
of remittances to group i will fall.  Remittances will therefore decline.  
 
4. Remittances and the brain drain: econometric evidence 
 
Empirical analysis of the brain drain has been hampered by the lack of comprehensive and 
comparable data. Thanks however to the pioneering work of Carrington and Detragiache (1998) and 
the contribution of Docquier and Marfouk (2004),  this gap is now being filled. Carrington and 
Detragiache (1998) rely on the 1990 US census to estimate the number of skilled migrants to the US 
from a large set of sending countries. Unfortunately, for non US destinations, they only have 
information on the total number of migrants. They address this shortcoming by assuming that 
migrants to non US OECD destinations have the same skill composition as migrants to the US. 
Obviously, their origin country data on the brain drain are a valid approximation only for those 
countries that send most of their migrants to the US. Docquier and Marfouk (2004) overcome this 
limitation by relying on national sources for destinations other than the US to estimate the skill 
composition of migrants
6. Finally, both Carrington and Detragiache (1998) and Docquier and 
Marfouk (2004)  relate the total figure of skilled migrants to the Barro Lee data set on educational 
achievements to derive a measure of migration rates for skilled workers.  
  
In what follows, we rely on the Docquier and Marfouk (2004) data set to investigate the relationship 
between remittances and skilled migration. Our estimating equation is inspired by the model in 
section 3
7. We distinguish two groups of migrants, skilled and unskilled. We denote remittance of 
skilled and unskilled workers by RS and RU respectively. Total remittances are therefore identically 
equal to: 
 
R = mS RS + mU RU           (9) 
 
where mi denotes the number of migrants in group i. To implement the model in section 3, we 
would need detailed information on the degree of family reunification and the numbers of close 
versus distant relatives. While we have no such data, we can nonetheless derive an estimating 
equation. What the model suggests is that for either skilled or unskilled migrants remittances are a 
                                                 
6 Docquier and Marfouk (2004) also extend the Carrington and Detragiache dataset to 2000. 
7 Our results differ from those in Faini (2002) for two main reasons. First, we use a different and broader data set. 
Second, the estimating equation is more closely related to theory.    9
function of the migrant’s wage and the income of his family members. We can therefore write the 
following behavioural equation:  
 
Ri = αi wi – βi yi          i=S,U         (10) 
 
where wi and yi denote respectively the wage level of migrant i and the per capita income of his 
household members. We know that, with altruism,  remittances should be a declining function of yi 
(the income of those left behind). Hence, we expect. βi > 0 for i=S;U, where βi measures  the degree 
of altruism. The impact of wi is instead ambiguous. If the reunification effects is stronger than the 
wage effect, it could well be that αi is less than zero, with higher wages leading to less rather than 
more remittances. We are mainly interested in a milder form of this paradox, namely the possibility 
that high wage skilled migrants remit relatively less than unskilled workers. This will be true if αS 
wS < αU wU. Finally, we assume, based on common sense and human capital theory, that skilled 
migrants earn more than unskilled workers, i.e. that wS > wU. Hence, for our paradox to hold (i.e. 
for αS wS < αU wU),  we need that αS  to be sufficiently smaller than αU, an hypothesis fully 
consistent with our model. Given that we have no strong a priori on the functional form of eq. 10, in 
what follows therefore we first postulate a linear relationship and then experiment also with a log 
linear functional form.  
 
We face an additional hurdle, given that  we have no separate information on the wage level of 
skilled and unskilled migrants (wi) and the income of their household members (yi).  We can 
nonetheless substitute equation 10 for i=S,U in equation 9 and estimate an aggregate equation. After 
some simple algebra we find that:  
 
R/P = αUwU M/P + (αSwS - αUwU) mS/P  – βU  (1-pSyS/Y) mU/pU Y/P –  βS  pSyS/Y  mS/pS Y/P (11) 
 
where M (= mS + mU) is total migration, P ( = pS + pU) denotes total population, and Y (= pSyS + 
pUyU) represent total income in the home country.  Equation (11) can be estimated by regressing per 
capita remittances (R/P), on the total stock of migrant abroad relatively to population (M/P)
8, the 
ratio of skilled migrants to the home country population (mS/P), and income per capita times the 
migration rate of unskilled and skilled workers (mU/pU Y/P and mS/pS Y/P). The major shortcoming 
of this approach is the need to assume that the unobservable distributional parameter, pSyS/Y, is the 
same across countries.  
                                                 
8 Notice that M/P does not indicate real money supply but the total migration rate.   10
 
Our data sources are as follows. Remittance data come from the IMF. They include workers 
remittances, compensation of employees, and capital transfers. Population and income data come 
from the World Bank. All other data are from Docquier and Marfouk (2004). We have data for 
1990 and 2000 for both the level and the composition of migration. Remittance data are averaged 
over 1990-91 and 2000-01.  
 
We first estimate eq. 11 for each period separately. We then pool the data, after testing that the 
relevant coefficients are constant across time and, accordingly, that pooling is appropriate. In the 
pooled equation, we control for possible time effects by adding a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 in the year 2000. We expect the coefficient on the stock of migrants to be higher in 2000, 
given that wages are likely to have increased between 1990 and 2000. Hence, we experiment with 
an alternative specifications that interacts the time dummy with the migration stock variable. The 
pooled estimates are presented in column 1 of table 2
9. The pooling restriction is not rejected by the 
data at the 5% significance level, with F(4, 178) = 0.94. 
 
Generally speaking, the coefficients have the expected sign. Most of them are significantly different 
from zero at standard statistical levels. The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, total 
migration carries a positive sign, as expected. Ceteris paribus, therefore, an increase in the M/P, the 
stock of migrant relative to the home country population, will be associated with a larger flow of  
remittances, Second, the coefficient of  mS/P is negative, but not significantly different from zero. 
This coefficient is key for our analysis. We have seen that  (αSwS - αUwU) could be of either sign 
depending whether the wage effect is stronger or weaker than the reunification effect.  A negative 
sign indicates that αSwS < αUwU, i.e. that the reunification effect is stronger than the  wage effect. 
Finally, our estimates also suggest that βU > 0 and that  βS < 0. Apparently, the degree of altruism, 
as measured by the coefficient  βi, is positive for unskilled workers, but negative in the case of 
skilled workers. In column 2 we allow for the fact that many of our observations are censored at 
R=0. The results are basically unchanged with respect to column 1 and stay so even if we restrict 
our sample to those observation with R>0 (column 3). 
  
In column 4, we introduce some curvature in the relationship between remittances and home 
income. As noticed earlier, we have no strong a priori about the functional form of eq. 10 and feel 
therefore worthwhile to experiment with alternative functional specifications. We find again that 
                                                 
9 The estimates for each period separately are available from the author. Also, we only report the specification with the 
time dummy interacted with the migration stock variable.    11
remittances are positively affected by a larger stock of migrants and that the population share of 
skilled migrants carries a negative, albeit statistically insignificant, coefficient. Interestingly 
enough, the degree of altruism of both skilled and workers is now found to be positive. Note that, if 
we are willing to assume that  βU = βS, namely an equal degree of altruism between skilled and 
unskilled migrants, we can easily compute the distributional parameter. We find that   pSyS/Y = 
0.24, a somewhat large but not unreasonable value.  
 
We also control for the possibility that the total migration rate is endogenous. We re-estimate  the 
equation with an instrumental variable procedure, using the (log of) distance between the home and 
the host country
10 as an instrument. Distance is typically a major determinant of migration; at the 
same time,  it should not affect a a financial flow such as remittances. Hence, it should be quite an 
adequate instrument. The R
2 of the first stage regression is 0.96 and the F statistics is 685.8.  
Distance is a significant determinant of migration, suggesting that it contains a lot of additional and 
hopefully exogenous information. In the second stage regression (reported in column 5 of table 2), 
all previous results carry through and, if anything, are even stronger both in terms of coefficients 
size and statistical significance.  
 
We can now assess the impact of a shift in the composition of migration toward skilled workers, 
keeping both the stock of migrants, per capita income of those left behind, and the migrants’ wages 
constant.  From eq. 11, we see that: 
 
 
∂(R/P)/∂( mS/pS)  =  (αSwS - αUwU) pS/P  – βS  [pSyS/Y] Y/P + βU [pUyU/Y] pS/pU Y/P  (12) 
 
The effect of an increase in mS/pS (and of a proportionate decline in mU/pU ) will vary among 
countries as a function of the skill composition of population (pS/P and pS/pU) and income per capita 
(Y/P)  Table 3 shows the total effect for a selected set of countries. The impact on remittances of a 
shift toward skilled migrants is always negative. Equally crucially, it turns to be quite large for a 
number of countries, such as Jamaica (-4.8%), El Salvador (-3.2%), Lesotho (-2.9) and Morocco (-
1.5%). The impact is particularly strong for the Caribbeans and the Central American countries, but 
quite significant also for countries in other regions. On average, a rise of 10% in the share of skilled 
migrant is associated with a fall of 1% in the GDP share of remittances, a substantial impact
11.  
                                                 
10 We take a weighted average of income per capita in the EU and in the US, with weights reflecting the relative 
importance of these two destinations. 
11 The results are only little changed if we set the coefficient on pS/P equal to zero.    12




It is often argued that the negative impact of the brain drain may be mitigated by its favourable 
effect on remittances. We have shown in this paper that this is not generally true. The brain drain 
seems to be associated with a lower rather than a larger flow of remittances. This is both because 
skilled migrants are more likely to come from relatively wealthy families and because their 
propensity to remit is relatively lower, presumably reflecting the fact that they are keener (and more 
able) to bring their most close relatives in the host country. 
  
The findings of this paper will need to be confirmed by further research, especially at the household 
level. Anyway, they show that skilled migration is unlikely to boost and may actually depress the 
flow of remittances to the source country. Whether in turn the negative impact on remittances of the 




                                                 
12 See however Chami et al. (2003) and Faini (2002) for some (conflicting) evidence on the link between growth and 
remittances. See also Rajan and Subramanian (2005a,b) for an insightful discussion of the different growth impact of 




Adams R. (1991), The economic uses and impact of international remittances in rural Egypt, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 39, 695-722. 
 
Adams R. (1998), Remittances, investment and rural asset accumulation in Pakistan, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 47, 155-173. 
 
Barro Robert and Xavier Sala-I-Martin (1995) Economic Growth , McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Beine M., F. Docquier, and H. Rapoport (2001), Brain drain and economic growth: theory and 
evidence, Journal of Development Economics, 64, 275-289. 
 
Beine M., F. Docquier, and H. Rapoport (2003), Brain drain and LDCs’ growth: winners and losers, 
IZA Discussion Paper n. 819, IZA, Bonn.  
 
Burnside C. and D. Dollar (2000), Aid, policies, and growth, American Economic Review, 90, 4, 
847-68. 
 
Burnside D. and D. Dollar (2004), Aid, policies, and growth: revisiting the evidence, Policy 
Research Working Papern. 3251, the World Bank, Washington. 
 
Bhagwati J. (1976), The international brain drain and taxation. A survey of the issues, in J. 
Bhagwati (ed.), The brain drain and taxation. Theory and empirical analysis. North Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
  
Bhagwati J. and K. Hamada (1974), The brain, international integration of markets for professionals 
and unemployment: a theoretical analysis, Journal of Development Economics, 1.  
 
Carrington W. and E. Detragiache (1998), How big is the Brain drain?, IMF Working Paper n. 
98/102. 
 
Chami R., C. Fullenkamp, and S. Jahjah (2003), Are immigrant remittance flows a source of capital 
for development?, IMF Annual Research Conference, IMF, Washington. 
 
Docquier F. and A. Marfouk (2004), Measuring the international mobility of skilled workers (1990-
2000), Policy Research Working Paper n. 3381, the World Bank, Washington.  
 
Easterly W. (2001), The lost decades: explaining developing countries’ stagnation in spite of  policy 
reforms, Journal of Economic Growth, 6, 2 , 135-157 
 
Easterly W. (2003), Can foreign aid buy growth?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3. 
 
Easterly W., R. Levine, and D. Roodman (2004), New data, new doubts: revisiting “Aid policies 
and growth”, American Economic Review, June. 
 
Faini R. (2002), Development, Trade, and Migration, Revue d’Économie et du Développement, 
Proceedings from the ABCDE Europe Conference, 1-2, 85-116. 
   15
Hamada K. and J. Bhagwati (1976), Domestic distortions, imperfect information and the brain 
drain, in J. Bhagwati (ed.), op. cit.  
 
Johnson G. and W. Whitelaw (1974), Urban-rural income transfers in Kenya: an estimated 
remittances function, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 22, 473-479. 
 
Lipton M. (1980), Migration from rural areas of poor countries: the impact on rural productivity and 
income distribution, World development, 8, 12. 
 
Lucas R.E.B. and O. Stark (1985), Motivations to remit: evidence from Botswana, Journal of 
Political Economy, 93, 901-918.  
 
Mountford A. (1997), Can a brain drain be good for growth in the source economy?, Journal of 
Development Economics, 53, 287-303. 
 
OECD (2003), Economic Outlook, OECD, Paris. 
 
Rajan R. and A. Subramanian (2005a), “Aid And Growth: What Does The 
Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?”, NBER Working Paper 11513, NBER, Cambridge, Mass. 
 
Rajan R. and A. Subramanian (2005b), “What Undermines Aid’s Impact On Growth?”, NBER 
Working Paper 11657, NBER, Cambridge, Mass. 
 
Rempel H. and R. Lobdell (1978), The role of urban-to-rural remittances in rural development, 
Journal of Development Studies, 14, 324-341. 
 
Rodriguez E. and S. Horton (1994), International return migration and remittances in the 
Philippines, in D. O’Connor and L. Farsakh (eds.), Development Strategy, Employment and 
Migration. Country Experiences, OECD Development Centre, Paris. 
 
Solimano A. (2002), Globalizing talent and human capital. Implications for developing countries, 
ABCDE Conference for Europe, Oslo.  
 
Stalker P. (1994), The work of strangers. A survey of international labour migration, International 
Labour Office, Geneva. 
 
Stark O. (2002), The economics of the brain drain turned on its head, mimeo.  
 
Stark O, C. Helmenstein, and A Prskawetz (1997), A brain gain with a brain drain, Economic 
Letters, 55, 227-234. 
 
Stark O, C. Helmenstein, and A Prskawetz (1998), Human capital formation, human capital 
depletion, and migration: a blessing or a “curse”, Economic Letters, 60, 363-367. 
 
Stark O. and R.E.B. Lucas (1988), Migration, remittances, and the family, Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 36, 465-481. 
 
World Bank (2003), Global Development Finance, Chapter 7, the World Bank, Washington. 
 
World Bank (2006), Global Economic Prospects. Economic implications of remittances and 
migration, the World Bank, Washington.    16
 
  
Figure  1  
 Family reunification 










1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
total unskilled    17
Table 1 
The pattern of attrition in the ECHP sample 
 
 
   
 






Household size  0.012  *** 0.019    0.025  * 
Age  -0.010 *** -0.012 *** -0.008 ***
Highest ed.  0.034  *** 0.063    0.120  * 
Intermediate  ed.  0.005  0.032  0.104 * 
Gender  0.062 *** 0.099  *  0.168 ***
Employment  0.108 *** 0.007    0.145 ***
Spouse  0.282 *** 0.249 *** 0.241 ***
Visits  -0.043 *** -0.055 *** -0.022  * 
Minutes  0.000  0.002  -0.002  
Immigrant        
Immigrant  EU        
Immigrant non 
E U         
Length  <5      0.416 *** 0.538 ***
Length  6-15      0.447 *** 0.567 ***
Length  16-25      0.689 *** 0.846 ***
Constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country 
dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time*Origin  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time  dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Nob  345830   6041  7823  
Nob _cens  40786    870    1208   
 
 
Legend: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
     Di=1 if the respondent does not drop out from the panel 
     Visits: number of visits to complete the interview at time t-1 
      Minutes: length of the interview at t-1 
      Length: immigrant’s length of stay in the host country 
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Table 2 
Remittances and the skill composition of migration 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  R/P R/P R/P  ln  (R/P)  ln  (R/P) 
M/P  3.7 (2.2)  4.3 (2.4)  3.8 (2.3)  0.36 (8.20)  0.47 (3.0) 
mS/P  -1.96 (0.22)  -0.9 (0.1)  -1.7 (0.2)  -0.09 (1.1)  -0.21 (1.42) 
mU/pU Y/P  0.15 (2.62)  0.17 (2.8)  0.13 (2.1)  --  -- 
mS/pS Y/P  -0.017 (3.5)  -0.025 (3.7)  -0.014(1.5)  --  -- 
mU/pU ln(Y/P)  --  --  --  -2.49 (4.2)  -4.24 (1.93) 
mS/pS ln(Y/P)
  -- -- --  -0.77  (6.3)  -0.87  (3.7) 
t M/P
  1.2 (0.8)  1.1 (0.7)  3.6 (0.4)  0.02 (1.19)  0.07 (1.62) 
R
2  0.63 0.62 0.63 0.45 0.42 
NOB  188 188 134 134 134 
 
Legends 
R: total remittances, M: migration stock, P: home country’s population, mS (mU) : skilled (unskilled) 
migrants, pS (pU): home country’s skilled (unskilled) population, Y: GDP, t: time effect.   19
Table 3 
 
The impact of a 10% increase in skilled migration on the GDP share of remittances 
 
Caribbean SubSaharan Africa
Antigua -1.38 Cote d'Ivoire -0.26
Barbados -0.89 Guinea Bissau -0.14
Dominica -1.45 Lesotho -2.86
Grenada -1.41 Mali -0.47
Jamaica -4.77 Mauritania -0.04
Mozambique -0.17
South America Nigeria -0.65
Sudan -0.63
Colombia -0.36 Swaziland -1.02
Ecuador -1.67 Tanzania -0.03




Central America Malaysia -0.11
Mongolia -0.24
Belize -0.86 Nepal -0.23
El Salvador -3.18 Philippines -1.00
Guatemala -0.73
Honduras -1.49 Western Asia
Mexico -0.62
Georgia -0.96




Tunisia -0.92  
 
Source: own calculations based on column 4 of Table 1 
 
  
 